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ABSTRACT. This paper investigates to what extent the ‘Propaganda Model’, 
which Edward S. Herman and Noam Chomsky developed in their work 
‘Manufacturing Consent’ (1988), applies to United States media discourses on 
how the US government should respond to the atrocities of the Ugandan 
warlord Joseph Kony. It establishes that the media in general does not 
sufficiently address US geopolitical and economic interests in the Central 
African region, the relative lack of civil rights in Ugandan society as a US ally, 
abuses by the Ugandan army, human rights implications of US support for 
Ugandan government policies, and the history of Western relations with 
Uganda. Instead of scrutinizing those aspects, the media highlights 
humanitarian concerns. By and large, these findings support the propaganda 
model. 
Introduction 
If ever a video on the internet went ‘viral,’ it is the YouTube video Kony 2012 
(Russell 2012). Kony 2012 is an online presentation that urges public leaders to arrest 
Ugandan guerilla group leader Joseph Kony, the head of the militia group Lord’s 
Resistance Army, before 2012. The video raises awareness of Kony’s use of child 
soldiers and compels the US government to assist the Ugandan government in 
capturing Kony. The video presentation received seven million views on the internet 
platform Vimeo within 16 days and over 43 million views on YouTube within only 72 
hours. 
The 30-minute video provides an overview of Kony’s atrocities in Uganda, followed 
by instructions to support the campaign for his capture by sharing the video and 
donating to Invisible Children, which is the non-profit organization that produced the 
video. Furthermore, the video presents clips of the time that its director, Jason 
Russell, spent in Uganda, as well as conversations with his son. Through 
conversations with his son, Russell illustrates the injustices that Ugandan children 
have to endure. Russell is a new media entrepreneur who felt compelled to raise 
awareness of atrocities in Uganda after having taken a trip there. The video explicates 
Russell’s plan to compel support from 12 political decision-makers, as well as 20 
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notable celebrities, billionaires, and athletes who are actively supporting humanitarian 
campaigns around the world, to devise legislation and US government strategies for 
Kony’s timely capture (for a summary of how the Kony 2012 video succeeded in 
attracting public attention and of the official and media reactions, see “Know Your 
Meme” 2012). 
On 7 March 2012, soon after the video was launched, media outlets began 
commenting on how quickly the video spread. Young people not only in the United 
States, but also in Australia and Europe began asking for Kony’s arrest through online 
posts, wearing Kony 2012 t-shirts, as well as donating to Invisible Children. 
Responses by the political establishment followed as a consequence of the 
proliferation of posts on social media outlets and coverage by the traditional media. 
For instance, on 8 March 2012, White House Press Secretary Jay Carney called the 
uproar for Kony’s arrest a “unique crisis of conscience.” 
Responses to the video, however, were not exclusively positive. Many pundits 
commented that Invisible Children has simplified a complex conflict and left out 
African voices by focusing only on Western activists and the director’s son. Ugandans 
pointed out that Kony has not been in Uganda for years. Instead, he is active in 
neighboring countries, for example the Central African Republic. For this reason, 
Ugandan and Western commentators urged against a military commitment by the 
United States to fight the Lord’s Resistance Army in Uganda. Further, some 
investigations suggested that the charity Invisible Children spent too much money on 
lobbying efforts and too little to help children rehabilitate in Uganda. Images from 
Uganda, in which Ugandans asserted that they have been depicted as undignified 
victims and their conflict is being commercialized, circulated on many websites.  
This paper investigates whether the “propaganda model,” which Edward S. Herman 
and Noam Chomsky developed in their seminal work “Manufacturing Consent” 
(1988), applies to the mainstream media discourse on how the United States should 
respond to the atrocities of Joseph Kony. Herman and Chomsky developed the 
propaganda model during the Cold War, albeit during a time when the Cold War drew 
to a close. This paper draws on the media responses to Kony 2012 to deliberate 
whether the propaganda model is still valid in the 21st Century. 
This question is relevant in relation to discourses on ‘humanitarian interventions’, 
which have become prominent in the post-Cold War era. The media as well as NGOs 
(Non Governmental Organizations) are instrumental in shaping public discussions on 
when Western nations should intervene in the contexts of human rights violations. 
This paper questions how well the US media reports on geostrategic interests of 
Western nations and past and present policies in regard to a country where human 
rights violations take place—i.e., Uganda. 
First, this paper provides a summary of Herman and Chomsky’s “Manufacturing 
Consent.” Second, it explains the relationship between Western countries and Uganda 
as well as Uganda’s human rights record. Third, it assesses to what extent US media 
coverage of US policies toward Uganda conform to the propaganda model and 
accounts for the realities of the history of US-Ugandan relationship and the Ugandan 
human rights record. 
Manufacturing Consent: The Propaganda Model 
In countries where the state regulates the media and persecutes journalists, censorship 
is a tangible phenomenon. By contrast, it is much more difficult to observe censorship 
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where the media is privatized and formal censorship is prohibited by law, especially 
when the media periodically exposes wrongdoing and corruption by governments and 
businesses and actively fashions itself as a beacon of free speech (Chomsky and 
Herman 1988: 1). 
Notwithstanding the constitutional framework of the US media, which proscribes 
governmental censorship, there are significant filters in the US media which, as 
Chomsky and Herman explicate, determine the content of media coverage. Following 
the argument of Chomsky and Herman, “the mass media of the United States are 
effective and powerful ideological institutions that carry out a system-supportive 
propaganda function by reliance on market forces, internalized assumptions, and self-
censorship, and without significant overt coercion” (Chomsky and Herman 1988: 
306).  
Not only the state, but also the market is capable of censoring media coverage. In the 
1980s, when Chomsky and Herman formulated the propaganda model, more and 
more media outlets became integrated into the market. The process of market-
integration was accelerated by a “loosening of rules limiting media concentration, 
cross-ownership, and control by non-media companies” (Chomsky and Herman 1988: 
8). In other words, more and more big companies like General Electric began owning 
media outlets such as TV stations and newspapers. Chomsky and Herman assert that 
newspapers became more and more dependent on advertising as a result of the 
influence of the corporate world on the media. For example, those newspapers with 
fewer advertising revenues would become more expensive and thereby lose out on the 
market. According to the propaganda model, many firms will discriminate against 
media outlets that are ideologically critical against corporations. Thus, the ‘radical 
press’ is structurally disadvantaged in a media-system that is market-driven. As a 
consequence of market-pressures, most journalists are bound to feel compelled to 
‘sanitize’ programs (Chomsky and Herman 1988: 16-17). 
For all these reasons, “the mass media are drawn into a symbiotic relationship with 
powerful sources of information by economic necessity and reciprocity of interest” 
(Chomsky and Herman 1988: 18). To avoid libel lawsuits, which have proliferated 
together with conservative media watchdogs in the 1980s, the media oftentimes treats 
information provided by governments and businesses as factual. According to 
Herman and Chomsky, media outlets reproduce information provided by public 
relations officers because of their fear of libel lawsuits. The Pentagon, for instance, 
has a public relations office that employs thousands of officials (Chomsky and 
Herman 1988: 19).  
Being objective means drawing from ‘objective’ and ‘neutral’ sources – for example, 
government officials, former government officials, think tanks, academics, and 
consultants (Chomsky and Herman 1988: 25). If foreign conflicts are covered, then 
‘expert knowledge’ is drawn from foreign government officials and think tanks 
associated with interests of the foreign government, if a friendly nation or ally is 
concerned. On the other hand, if a conflict between a local populace and a 
government that qualifies as an ‘official enemy’ is covered, then expert knowledge is 
drawn from refugees, dissidents and other populations that suffer from state coercion 
and violence. Of course, in the 1980s any association with the Soviet Union would 
make a government an ‘official enemy.’ Similarly, anticommunism serves as a control 
mechanism in domestic debates (Chomsky and Herman 1988: 29). Chomsky and 
Herman point out that liberals and progressives were oftentimes accused of being pro-
communist, and thereby as dangerous for property-owners and detrimental to geo-
strategic interests of the US. 
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To illustrate the propaganda model, Herman and Chomsky compare the media 
coverage of the assassination of Jerzy Popiełuszko, a priest who was murdered by the 
Polish police in the Soviet sphere of influence, and the assassinations of priests in 
Latin American countries that are in the US sphere of interest. The New York Times, 
Time Magazine and Newsweek provided detailed coverage of the assassination of 
Popiełuszko (Chomsky and Herman 1988: 38). The assassination of El Salvadorian 
archbishop Oscar Romero, on the other hand, did not receive such extensive coverage. 
Drawing from this example, Herman and Chomsky refer to ‘worthy’ and ‘unworthy’ 
victims (Chomsky and Herman 1988: 37). Victims are ‘worthy’ if they have been 
persecuted by governments that are ‘official enemies’ of the United States. If they 
have experienced violations committed by governments that are allied with the United 
States or the US government, they are deemed ‘unworthy victims’ who, according to 
Herman and Chomsky, receive scant media coverage.  
In the Popiełuszko case, the media covered details on the horrendous murder 
(Chomsky and Herman 1988: 42). In addition, the media asked who was responsible 
for the murder of Popiełuszko at the top governmental level (Chomsky and Herman 
1988: 43-44). The media appropriately asked what Moscow knew about the 
Popiełuszko assassination.  
But contrary to the germane journalistic rigor that the media exhibited in the 
Popiełuszko case, there is no systematic investigation of what Washington knew 
about the assassination of Archbishop Romero. Washington is generally not depicted 
as equally complicit in its client state’s crimes as Moscow in the crimes of its satellite 
states, even though the US has helped installing and supported several dictatorial 
regimes in the Middle East, Asia, and Latin America. 
Likewise, coverage of foreign elections tacitly supports US foreign policy interests. 
While the US media critically evaluated the Sandinista elections in Nicaragua, the US 
media were all praises for the elections in El Salvador and Guatemala which are both 
US’ state allies. Contrary to the media coverage, Latin American election observers 
described the Nicaraguan election as “a model of probity and fairness” (Chomsky and 
Herman 1988: 140). On the other hand, in El Salvador and Guatemala there was an 
upsurge of state-sponsored terror, including public showing of mutilated bodies, 
which intimidated the population on the eve of the election. Hence, intimidation was a 
cause for large voter turnout. The media never adequately contextualized this large 
voter turnout: “Nevertheless, in exact accord with the propaganda line of the state, the 
U.S. mass media found the large turnouts in these countries to be triumphs of 
democratic choice, the elections legitimizing, and ‘fledging democracies’” (Chomsky 
and Herman 1988: 141). By and large, the media failed to rigorously examine, 
compare and contrast the conditions in which elections in El Salvador, Guatemala, 
and Nicaragua took place. Otherwise, El Salvador and Guatemala would not have 
been hailed as “new democracies” while Nicaragua was condemned as an 
international pariah. 
Herman and Chomsky concede that the US media do not prohibit controversy. In 
this respect, it is different than the media in autocratic states. During the Vietnam 
War, for instance, many journalists questioned the wisdom of the US presence in 
Indochina. As a consequence, conservative pundits claimed the US “lost the war” 
through a media that acted “excessively democratic” and exposed the public to the 
misguided war effort in Southeast Asia (Chomsky and Herman 1988: 169-170).  
Chomsky and Herman do not question that criticism of the Vietnam War was 
possible, especially as the possibility that the US would win the war eroded more and 
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more. Rather, they claim that positions that were critical of the war needed to stay 
within a parameter of what was accepted criticism:  
A propaganda model leads to different expectations. On its assumptions, we would 
expect media coverage and interpretation of the war to take for granted that the United 
States intervened in the service of generous ideals, with the goal of defending South 
Vietnam from aggression and terrorism and in the interest of democracy and self-
determination. With regard to the second-level debate on the performance of the media, 
a propaganda model leads us to expect that there would be no condemnation of the 
media for uncritical acceptance of the doctrine of U.S. benevolence and for adherence 
to the official line on all central issues, or even awareness of these characteristics of 
media performance. (Chomsky and Herman 1988: 169-170) 
Chomsky and Herman contrast the coverage of the Vietnam War with the coverage of 
the Soviet Union in Afghanistan. The Western media was condemnatory in regards to 
the Soviet invasion. The Economist, quite appropriately, wrote “an invader is an 
invader unless invited in by a government with some claim to legitimacy” (Chomsky 
and Herman 1988: 176).  
Western reporters covered the war from the perspective of the rebels defending their 
territory from foreign attack. In the coverage of the Vietnam War, on the other hand, 
the point of view of refugees and peasants were ignored. The media immediately 
deconstructs Soviet pronouncements (Chomsky and Herman 1988: 176). Abuses by 
invading Soviet forces were documented by Western reporters. In comparison, there 
was little outrage when Cambodia, a third country, was massively bombed. The media 
ignored the perspectives of the victims of aerial bombings. Similarly, the connection 
between the bombing of Cambodia and the later rise of the Red Khmer was 
dismissed. The atrocities of the Red Khmer were represented as if they happened in a 
historical vacuum.  
Above all, “the search for ‘opposing viewpoints’ as things went wrong was also 
extremely narrow, limited to the domain of tactics – that is, limited to the question of 
‘whether the policy enunciated worked,’ viewed entirely from the standpoint of U.S. 
interests, and with official premises taken as given” (Chomsky and Herman 1988: 
178). 
Western-Ugandan Relations 
 
Idi Amin and the West: Idi Amin and the United Kingdom 
In October 1970, a coup d’état by general Idi Amin ended the rule of Prime Minister 
Milton Obote, who spent time at a Commonwealth summit in Singapore during the 
time of the coup. Idi Amin would become infamous for his extraordinarily brutal 
reign, which was marked by ethnic cleansings, extrajudicial killings, and erratic 
outbursts of violence. It was assessed that he was responsible for the deaths of over 
100,000 people between the years 1971-1975 (Hutton and Bloch 2001: para 2). 
Hutton and Bloch (2001: para 1) assert that the coup d’état was engineered by 
outside interests, particularly from the UK, because of Obote’s nationalization 
campaign. Obote wanted to take 60 per cent interests in all foreign and Ugandan-
Asian owned businesses. In Uganda, huge British financial, industrial, and 
agricultural interests were at stake due to the policies of Obote. Inspired by Pan-
Africanist discourses and ideologies, Obote wanted to reduce the influence of the 
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British. His ‘Common Man’s Charter’ and plans to nationalize 30 British companies 
were particularly unwelcome in London (Hutton and Bloch 2001: paras 4, 5). 
The first task of the British was to choose an opportune replacement for Obote. 
Amin seemed like a superb choice. In British circles, Amin was known as a man who 
was “a little short on the gray matter” and “intensely loyal to Britain” (Hutton and 
Bloch 2001: para 8). He was held in fond memories for his services as a non-
commissioned officer in the British colonial regiment. Some claim that relationships 
with Amin were cultivated since 1966. Plans for the overthrow of Obote became more 
concrete when Obote articulated his nationalization plans in 1969 (Hutton and Bloch 
2001: para 9). About 700 British troops arrived in neighboring Kenya a few days 
before. It took the UK government exactly one week to accept the legitimacy of the 
government of Amin. The hastiness of the acceptance of Amin surprised the US 
government.  
Idi Amin and the United States 
The US and Israeli governments also had presence and interests in Uganda, especially 
through their respective intelligence agencies, Mossad and the CIA (Hutton and Bloch 
2001: para 5). The US provided economic aid and Israel trained Ugandan troops. The 
US was supportive of the Israeli engagement with Uganda. At that time, there was 
fear that Israel might become diplomatically isolated. Thus, Israel’s push to form 
diplomatic relations with African countries was welcomed. Allegedly the Israeli 
military had cultivated support to Amin for some time prior to the coup.  
The late 1960s were the heyday of the CIA’s efforts to undermine governments 
whose ideologies were anti-Western and who could, if only hypothetically, become 
part of the Eastern bloc (Hutton and Bloch 2001: para 24). The US was already 
closely aligned with the governments of Kenya, Ghana, Mozambique, Tanzania, and 
Nigeria, and wanted to expand its power into Uganda. The Amin coup was similar to 
the one against the Pan-Africanist Nkrumah in Ghana in 1966. Nkrumah was also 
overthrown when he went abroad. There are allegations that the CIA actively 
supported the Nkrumah coup (Hutton and Bloch 2001: para 25).  
Amin was notorious for his violent purges of members of the armed forces. In July 
1978, the columnist Jack Anderson discovered that ten members of Amin’s trusted 
circle were trained in the International Police Academy in the Washington suburb of 
Georgetown. The CIA-run academy was responsible for training police personnel 
from all over the world. Three of the Ugandans were trained at a graduate school that 
was also run by the CIA called International Police Services Inc. The US stationed a 
police instructor in Uganda shortly after the coup. Despite the controversy, weapons 
were exported into Uganda – for instance, American Bell helicopters were delivered 
in 1973 (Hutton and Bloch 2001: 46-47). 
The Rule of Yoweri Museveni and US Foreign Policy 
Yoweri Kaguta Museveni has ruled Uganda since January 1986. Museveni was 
involved in a war that toppled Amin, and would eventually end his rule in 1979 (for a 
reading of the history of Museveni’s rule, see Musinguzi 2001). Museveni was 
criticized for his involvement in the war in the Democratic Republic of Congo, even 
though he brought stability to most of Uganda and presided over one of the most 
effective worldwide campaigns against HIV-AIDS. Initially, Museveni was lauded as 
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a new breed of an African leader who would lead the continent into a new democratic 
era. In recent years, however, international and national activists have questioned his 
democratic credentials. Before the 2006 election, he abolished presidential term 
limits. Moreover, Museveni began harassing and prosecuting Uganda’s domestic 
opposition. For example, in May 2011 security forces attacked opposition leaders in 
Kampala, Uganda’s capital, with fire hoses that drenched in pink-colored liquid, 
dying their clothes and skin. When the protest against rising food prices cumulated 
into a protest against the country’s president, security forces began arresting and 
shooting on protestors. The protests only died down when Museveni put the main 
opposition leader, Kizza Besigye, under virtual house arrest (Allen 2001: para 1). 
Museveni also amended the constitution to deny suspected rioters and ‘economic 
saboteurs’ bail, once they had been imprisoned.  
The American response to Museveni’s violent intimidation of protestors has been 
lukewarm. The government was merely asked to act “civil” (Kaufman 2011). A 
response to similar acts by Mugabe of Zimbabwe, which is a pariah state in the 
international system, would have surely elicited a stronger response. The tepid 
response may reflect Washington’s geopolitical and economic interests in the region, 
which might include access to Uganda’s resource. This assertion might be supported 
by reports according to which Exxon is interested in buying a share in Uganda’s oil. 
In the words of intelligence analyst Corbett (2012: para 1) which are published on an 
open source intelligence website: “When oil executives announced the discovery of 
the largest onshore oil reserves in the Lake Albert region of Uganda in July 2009, the 
landlocked, oft-neglected [sic] East African nation of Uganda went from relative 
obscurity to a key partner for multi-national oil conglomerates.” 
Uganda has a strategically important location in the region. It receives aid from the 
US government (Hearn 1997: 2). The aid is both military and civilian. The civilian aid 
aims at recovering the healthcare and agriculture in conflict-afflicted Uganda’s 
Northern regions (Anyangwe 2009). Uganda is an important US proxy in locations 
such as Sudan and Somalia (Corbett 2012: para 8). The LRA Bill (S1067, HR2478) 
would legitimate the US government to intervene in Uganda to apprehend Joseph 
Kony. The interest in Kony, which initially was raised by humanitarian groups, has 
existed before the video about him went viral. A decision by Obama to deploy troops 
into Uganda coincided with the discovery of oil and revelations that Ugandan 
politicians have accepted bribes from multinational oil companies (Corbett 2012: para 
3). 
Not only the United States, but also China is very involved in a continent that has 
phenomenal economic growth rates (i.e., with some countries growing at a rate of 
eight per cent per year), potential for future export markets, and untapped resources 
(Bernard 2012). Some commentators refer to a new ‘scramble for Africa’. In February 
2012, the newly-appointed Chinese Ambassador to Uganda, Zhao Yali, announced a 
program to improve ties to Uganda, including the implementation of tariff free 
exports, investment in transportation projects, power generators, and infrastructure 
(Corbett 2012: para 4). China is known for its massive construction projects in Africa 
(Center for Chinese Studies 2006: 7).  
Intelligence analyst Corbett suggests that the Kony video has been of convenience to 
economic and geopolitical planners in the US: 
But now, just as China makes its overtures toward Uganda to gain a potential toehold in 
the region and access to the as-yet-untapped oil wealth, a new video about Joseph Kony 
has suddenly gone viral online, having been viewed 10s of millions of times in just a 
week, and changing the focus of the American foreign policy debate toward greater US 
Jonas Ecke                                                                                                     IJIS Vol. 8, No. 1, 2012 
 
 138 
military involvement in oil-rich Uganda. Perhaps unsurprisingly, it suggests that the 
only way to capture Kony is to maintain an American military presence in the region… 
What the film’s well-meaning supporters, many of them youth activists rallying behind 
a political cause for the first time, don’t realize, is that the Kony film, whether wittingly 
or not, is accomplishing what years of Pentagon propaganda could not muster: public 
support for an expanded American military role in Africa. (Corbett 2012: paras 5-8) 
The emerging geostrategic role of Africa, which is important for an understanding of 
the context of policies in regard to the continent, is reflected in US plans for a unified 
military command for Africa called Africom. In 2006, former defense secretary 
Donald Rumsfeld began establishing a committee to advise on its planning and 
implementation. Its mission statement reads that it intends to “strengthen our security 
cooperation with Africa and create new opportunities to bolster the capabilities of our 
partners in Africa” (Corbett 2012: para 9). Proponents point out the importance of US 
support for regional security missions in the midst of failed states, while opponents 
assert Africom serves to consolidate a permanent US presence on the continent. 
African heads of state thus far have lacked enthusiasm for the project and minimized 
cooperation.  
Anglophone Uganda is a reliable Christian partner within a region that is rife with 
Islamic movements. Partially for this reason, domestic conservative Christian groups 
in the US, for example ‘The Family,’ engage themselves in Ugandan politics. 
Ugandan politicians have close ties to groups in the US that claim that homosexuality 
can be cured. These groups have been inspired to enact a bill according to which 
homosexual acts would be punished by execution. A global outcry and pressure – 
including by the US government, which announced that it would make the rights of 
homosexuals a condition of aid (Ssegawa 2011) – led to a withdrawal of the bill. 
Nonetheless, behind closed doors the bill has circulated back into parliamentarian 
circles (Badash 2011). According to recent reports, the Ugandan parliament is 
scheduled to pass the bill before the end of 2012 (Muhumuza 2012). 
Moreover, allegations have been made that the Ugandan army commits human rights 
abuses in its pursuit of the Lord’s Resistance Army, Kony’s brutal militia. For 
example, it is alleged that the Ugandan military pressured children who were released 
and captured from the Lord’s Resistance Army to fight for the national armed forces. 
Children under the age of 15 served in so-called Local Defense Units, even though the 
Kony 2012 campaign endorses financial and political investments into the Uganda 
army and the staff of Invisible Children allegedly has ties to the Uganda government 
(Keating 2012). In the words of the Child Soldiers Global Report 2008, which 
explicate the dangers of policies that escalate military action (para 2): 
Armed conflict between government forces and the opposition Lord’s Resistance Army 
(LRA) in northern Uganda continued between 2004 and early 2006. The government’s 
strategy of pursuing a military solution to the conflict contributed to humanitarian 
suffering and abuses against the civilian population. 
The Propaganda Model and Kony 2012 
To assess whether the propaganda model is relevant for the coverage of Kony 2012, I 
examined ten media outlets that reach a wide audience to investigate whether they 
reported about six aspects of the contemporary situation in Uganda and its 
relationship with the West, especially the United States. More specifically, I 
investigated whether the articles from the ten media outlets reported on the following 
aspects: (1) US geopolitical interests in the Central African region, for example with 
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regard to Africom; (2) US economic interests in the region, for example the existence 
of large supplies of oil as well as economic competition with China; (3) the relative 
lack of civil rights in Ugandan society; (4) abuses by the Ugandan army; (5) US 
support for Uganda government policies and the human rights implications of US 
policies towards Uganda, for example sending military advisers and equipment to the 
country; and (6) the history of Western relations to the country. I learned about these 
aspects by researching them outside of the mainstream media, for example on an 
open-source website by intelligence analyst Corbett. 
The ten news outlets I examined were ABC News, CNN, The New York Times, NBC 
(San Diego), The Washington Post, Fox News, MSNBC, The Huffington Post, CBS 
This Morning, and the Los Angeles Times. Mostly I investigated the first relevant 
article that came up when I searched for the name of the news outlet as well as Kony 
2012 in the search engine website Google. The articles had to address the situation in 
Uganda to some extent to be considered for analysis. In general, I did not analyze 
articles that addressed a second video by Invisible Children that responded to 
criticisms of the first video (Invisible Children 2012). Whether the ten news outlets 
mentioned the aforementioned aspects is depicted in the graphical representation 
below. 
Omission of important facts about the autocratic nature of the Ugandan regime as a 
US ally, the history of Western nations in promoting autocratic governance in the 
country, and geopolitical and economic interests in the region would indicate that the 
propaganda model is of relevance in the coverage of the context of the Kony 2012 
video. After all, these would be omissions that would contradict a narrative of the 
United States and Western countries as champions of human rights and democracy in 
the region. On the whole, the Kony 2012 video presents United States military 
engagement as a solution to the grave problem of the existence of the Lord’s 
Resistance Army and its horrific human rights violations in Northern Uganda.  
Newspaper outlets did not report about many of the critical aspects of Ugandan 
politics and human rights record as well as Uganda’s relationship with the West in 
general and the United States in particular (see Table 1). There was, for instance, not 
one mention of the geopolitical and economic interests the United States has in the 
region. Instead of the aspects of Ugandan politics and Uganda’s relationship with the 
West that I was looking for, newspaper outlets mostly reported on other issues. For 
example, CNN-US asked in its headline whether Kony 2012 created “the wrong 
buzz.” Can a “foreign travesty against humanity” (CNN 2012: para 5) be stopped 
through a “slick Hollywood production” (CNN 2012: para 8)? ABC summarized the 
terror that the region endured because of Kony and his militia and announces that 
Obama will send 100 military advisors. ABC did not mention human rights 
implications of US-Ugandan military cooperation. 
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Figure 1 
Graphical Representation on whether six critical contextual aspects of Kony 2012 have been 
mentioned by ten media outlets 
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 Branham and Kelly of the New York Times urge that “[t]he voices of affected 
individuals and communities should be at the center of this swelling chorus of 
opinions. If they were, perhaps the clamor of criticism could quiet long enough to 
hear what is being asked of humanitarians, academics, policy makers, and global 
citizens” (CNN 2012: para 2). Further, Branham and Kelly describe that the deaths 
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occurring in Uganda “are not only from direct violence, but from water-borne illness, 
malaria, and a profound destruction of the healthcare infrastructure. For every one 
immediate tragedy of execution or abduction by the LRA, there are untold stories of 
people fighting a quieter fight – struggling against the pervasive and insidious effects 
of instability” (CNN 2012: para 10). They do not, however, give detail on policies and 
the history that lead to this instability.  
 NBC San Diego, which was the first NBC station that came up in my Google 
search, detailed the protests of a local activist group against the Museveni regime, 
without mentioning the US support for Museveni. The Washington Post describes that 
the interest for the hunt for Kony has died down since the video went viral. It 
interviews the director of programs of ‘Invisible Children.’ Further, it mentions the 
deployment of 100 military advisors, but no abuses by the Ugandan army. Fox News 
focused on the cruelties of Kony and his militia. Considering the reputation of Fox 
News as ‘hawkish’, it is surprising that the article also mentions a warning about the 
prospects of a military intervention by a doctorial student who investigated the local 
conflict: 
“While their intentions are good, it’s quite dangerous because they make no mention of 
the fact that someone will have to use force to apprehend Kony,” Jack McDonald, a 
doctoral candidate and research associate at King’s College’s Department of War 
Studies in London told FoxNews.com. “People will get hurt trying to bring him to 
justice and it will likely be the local nationals.” [Fox 2012: para15] 
MSNBC features a report by Seattle’s King 5 news, which questions whether a 
movement that exists merely online can produce real change. Furthermore, it gives 
details of US involvement in strengthening local forces in hunting down Kony, but 
does not mention human rights implications. The report mentions the bipartisan 
support that exists in Washington, D.C. for hunting down Kony. 
The Huffington Post had, by far, the most critical coverage, although it failed to 
mention US economic and geopolitical interests in the region. It mentions the bill that 
persecutes and would execute gays in Uganda. Further, it describes that the 
International Criminal Court has charged Uganda for human rights abuses and 
systematic looting in the Congo while Uganda pursued its hunt for Kony (Huffington 
Post 2012: para 7). The article even quotes a UN Mapping report that suggests that the 
Uganda military may have been complicit in acts of genocide in the Democratic 
Republic of Congo (UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights 2010, in 
Huffington Post 2012: para 9).1 Further, the article describes that the Ugandan police 
and military forced 20,000 Northern Ugandans from their land and burned much of it. 
The brutal crackdown of Museveni against his opponents is mentioned as well 
(Huffington Post 2012: para 10). The article also mentions that the Ugandan army—
the UPDF (Uganda’s People Defense Force)—violently forced hundreds of thousands 
of Northern Ugandan Acholi tribe members into internment camps beginning in 1996 
(Huffington Post 2012: para 11). In addition, it details how locals who have suffered 
severely from the violence of the Lord’s Resistance Army believe that the Invisible 
Children movie depicts victims of Kony in an undignified manner. Moreover, 
Ugandans take issue with the ‘militarized’ approach to the conflict and assert the 
video is guilty of ‘warmongering’ that will not constructively solve the conflict. 
According to the report, the Ugandan police dispersed a demonstration against the 
movie. One person reportedly died, dozens were injured (Huffington Post 2012: paras 
19-25). 
CBS News discusses the expenses of the charity and whether the video will only be 
“a fad” or have a lasting impact. The Los Angeles Times critiques the “White Savior 
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Industrial Complex.” The paper paraphrases critiques that mention that young 
American campaigners pay “scant attention to the atrocities committed by the 
Ugandan military (which they support in the hunt for Kony) or the Sudan People’s 
Liberation Army, including attacks on civilians” (para 9). Further, the Los Angeles 
Times quotes Deibert (2012), whose analysis also informed the piece in the 
Huffington Post: 
Deibert wrote that, after a failed attempt to get Kony not long ago (supported by U.S. 
advisors), the warlord’s army counterattacked against villages in Congo, resulting in the 
death of hundreds of people and the kidnapping of 100 children. ‘What is the system of 
protection that Invisible Children advocates for communities such as these, put in the 
line of fire by the military operations the group advocates?’ Deibert asked. 
Concluding Remarks 
This paper has been an attempt to investigate whether the propaganda model is still 
relevant in the 21st century. Certainly, many of its preconditions have not changed. 
The mass media, for instance, is still owned by big corporations. In the future it would 
be interesting to assess to which extent Islamophobia as well as rhetoric as regards the 
War on Terror replaced anticommunism as a control mechanism, particularly in the 
immediate aftermath of the terrorist attacks of 9/11. For future analysis, it would also 
be interesting to see whether new media platforms, such as blogs or twitter, adhere to 
the confines of the propaganda model. This paper has investigated media outlets that 
are under the influence of traditional gatekeepers such as the foreign policy 
establishment and corporate interests. I specifically sought out critical information to 
counterbalance official narratives.  
Even though some media outlets mentioned critiques of Ugandan and American 
policies, my study suggests that the media generally do not pay sufficient attention to 
the human rights implications of US policies, the relative lack of civil rights in 
Uganda, abuses by the Ugandan army, US support for the Ugandan government and 
the history of Western-Ugandan relations. Critique of Kony 2012 as a campaign was 
pervasive. Critiques of Ugandan-US cooperation, US military assistance, and the 
Ugandan human rights records, as well as a historical contextualization of current 
events were much rarer even though some of these aspects were mentioned.  
My study indicates that criticisms are constrained and mostly fit into the confines of 
the propaganda model, especially since US economic and geopolitical interests are not 
mentioned once in any of the articles. Some critical remarks about the outcomes and 
ripple effects of potential military actions, for instance, are represented in the sample. 
What is missing is a critical investigation of why the US is already present in the 
Uganda conflict. Information on the historical context is lacking. It is taken as a given 
that the US will act in the interest of human rights, even if articles concede that US 
actions may have unintended consequences. The new ‘Scramble for Africa’ and 
competition with Chinese and Islamic elements as well as the establishment of 
Africom and how it relates to US policies and interests towards Uganda, for instance, 
are not mentioned. 
The intent of this essay is not to question the authenticity and genuineness of the 
Kony 2012 producers and of journalists. The Kony 2012 producers have raised 
awareness of a very important human rights issue, though they are not mindful of the 
Western-Ugandan relationship, Ugandan abuses and the US role in the region. Kony 
2012 inspired young people, who were otherwise unconcerned about African civil 
wars, to act on behalf of war victims. Some of the journalists that were investigated in 
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this study raise vitally important questions about the representation of non-Western 
suffering by Westerners, the integration of African voices into the coverage of 
African conflicts and the commercialization of conflict coverage. 
Nonetheless, journalists must become equally critical towards geopolitics and the 
policies of US allies such as Uganda. After all, policy actions such as the Amin coup, 
the enforcement of economic interests and Western support for factions in Central 
Africa—which have not been sufficiently investigated and made public by the 
media—are one of the reasons the region is as destabilized and provides a breeding 
ground for the likes of Kony. As Westerners, we need to have an honest reckoning 
about our engagement with Central Africa if we share the interests of the makers of 
Kony 2012 to contribute to sustainable solutions to the suffering and abuses that have 
crippled Uganda and the wider region for too long. 
Note 
1. The Uganda government vigorously rejects UN Mapping assertions that its military may have 
been implicated in acts of genocide in the Democratic Republic of Congo. In the words of 
Ugandan Foreign Affairs Minister Sam Kutesa, “[t]he draft report under reference is a 
compendium of rumours, deeply flawed in methodology, sourcing and standard of proof” 
(Ugandan Correspondent 2012: para 2). 
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